Reason as logic, or reason as motive, or reason as a way of life? They don't have to give me a reason. I can write my own damn reason. And that is better than the half-baked tolerance that comes from no longer caring. (George Smiley)
A couple of things available through the White Rose Consortium ePints Repository:
The Politics of The Self
On the Alleged Shallowness of Compatiblism
The Politics of The Self
On the Alleged Shallowness of Compatiblism
A couple of things available through JSTOR:
Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism
Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral Responibility
Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism
Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral Responibility
Here is a podcast of my Inaugural Lecture given at the University of Sheffield on 13th May 2009. It is an attempt to explain to an nonspecialized audience what some of my work in philosophy is about:
Making Ethics Intelligible (podcast)
And here is the text of the lecture:
Making Ethics Intelligible (text).
Making Ethics Intelligible (podcast)
And here is the text of the lecture:
Making Ethics Intelligible (text).
Here is an attempt to explain why the case for robust moral realism is not supported by appealing to epistemic normativity as a companion in guilt:
Review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.
Review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.
And here is another NDPR review where I do something I very seldom do and disagree with Allan Gibbard:
Review on Notre Dame Phiosophical Reviews of Allan Gibbard: Reconciling Our Aims.
Review on Notre Dame Phiosophical Reviews of Allan Gibbard: Reconciling Our Aims.
Here is what I think is wrong with some neo-Aristotelian attempts to make sense of ethics:
"The Saucer of Mud, the Kudzu Vine and the Uxorious Cheetah: Against Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism in Metaethics" (European Journal of Analytic Philosophy I).
"The Saucer of Mud, the Kudzu Vine and the Uxorious Cheetah: Against Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism in Metaethics" (European Journal of Analytic Philosophy I).
And here is why Michael Smith is wrong about why expressivism is wrong:
Review of: Michael Smith: "Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5(3), September 2002 in BEARS
Review of: Michael Smith: "Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5(3), September 2002 in BEARS
Here is my entry on Moral Naturalism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
And my entry on Reasons for Action: Justification vs. Explanation also in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Here is a link to my pages on Flickr.









